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Abstract
This Roundtable began life as a public event on the subject of liquid 
crystals in our visual, material, media, scientific and artistic cultures. The 
event’s premise was that liquid crystals are the ur-form that constitute 
and govern Modernity and its after-shocks. For sure this is because the 
dialectic of liquidity and crystallization, of flow and refraction, is key 
to the advent of screen-based media (LCD TVs, computers and mobile 
devices) and thus how we perceive, image and imagine the world. As 
such, liquid crystals as a ‘phase of matter’ are epochal. But more than this 
because, while the emergence of such a brave new world is manifestly 
contemporary and their ‘discovery’ is comparatively recent (1888), the 
very fact of liquid crystals goes back at least 4.5 billion years: water, 
for instance, is crystalline and thus our planet, our ecology and we 
ourselves are always already liquid crystal. Such a self-evident but under-
acknowledged fact, discerned and foregrounded superbly by Esther 
Leslie in her recent book Liquid Crystals: The Science and Art of a Fluid 
Form (2016), becomes an occasion to bring together historians, theorists 
and practitioners of the convergences of design-science, media-ecology, 
political-aesthetics, and graphic-technologies. Using Leslie’s book as a 
springboard, each of the five contributors, including Leslie herself, were 
invited to deliver a 10-minute presentation, an opening statement to set 
the scene, and raise fundamental questions to be considered further in 
the ensuing discussion. This structure is retained here, along with some 
of the informality that live conversation affords.
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Emily Candela (EC): The experience of reading Liquid Crystals mirrors 
the dialectics of the fluid and crystalline that characterize the ‘liquid crystal 
epoch’ described in Esther Leslie’s book: the narrative flows unfettered by 
the limitations of discipline boundaries such as those between the histories 
of science, art, technology and design. As in an animated film, however, this 
flow unfolds as a series of pauses. A constellation of distinct moments and 
images generates Leslie’s dialectics of liquidity and crystallinity: from Caspar 
David Friedrich’s 1824 painting The Sea of Ice and early images of liquid 
crystals produced in the 19th-century German physicist Otto Lehmann’s 
laboratory, to the looting of flat-screen TVs during the 2011 London riots 
and the ‘slosh’ of data between the little screens in our pockets.
A central thread developed by this liquid-crystal dynamic is the question 
‘what is life?’ and its pursuit in the period covered in the text, from the 
early 19th century until today. This is, in one sense, a scientific question. 
The complexity of determining what falls on either side of the boundary 
between the living and non-living becomes apparent through the history 
of reflections on crystals, which have at various moments in the history of 
science teetered on the edge of this boundary. This is in part due to early 
observations of crystals’ life-like attributes – their capacity to grow, self-
assemble or even to become ‘wounded’ (Leslie, 2016: 37, 38).
The science of crystals acquired new entanglements with the investigation of 
the nature of life in the 20th century with the introduction of X-ray imaging 
technologies that meant scientists could probe the internal structures 
of crystals. The ‘what is life’ question animated the work of many mid-
20th-century X-ray crystallographers, who visualized the sub-microscopic 
structures of matter, from minerals to proteins and viruses.
The techniques of X-ray crystallography, which developed in the early 20th 
century, allowed scientists to generate data about matter at the scale of 
structures of atoms and molecules. By beaming X-rays through a crystal, which 
diffract off the atoms inside, crystallographers are left with a coded pattern 
etched by the diffracted X-rays, which – when de-coded – reveal a crystal’s 
internal atomic structure. While the field of X-ray crystallography began with 
investigations of substances more conventionally thought of as crystals, such as 
salt, crystallographic techniques were soon applied to the materials of life. The 
most well-known example of this is Rosalind Franklin’s X-ray crystallographic 
analysis of DNA that led to the elucidation of its double-helix structure in 1953.
X-ray crystallography’s uses in the growing field of molecular biology produced 
conceptions of life understood through molecular and atomic structure. 
Models and diagrams of organic matter, such as Francis Crick and James 
Watson’s DNA model constructed of hard metal plates, clamps and rods, see 
biological subjects frozen in time. Such models broadcast new materialities for 
the invisible underpinnings of life, which took on abstract forms decipherable 
only by the expert (Figure 1). Some of these forms were nevertheless exhibited 
in 1951 at the Festival of Britain in the context of products for the home. 
The Festival Pattern Group, a consortium of manufacturers, designers and 
a scientist, the crystallographer Helen Megaw, showed a series of objects 
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bearing so-called ‘crystal designs’ (Hartland Thomas, 1951) (Figure 2). 
Their surface patterns for wares such as carpets, wallpaper, glass and metal 
were derived from crystal structure diagrams of both inorganic and organic 
substances, such as insulin and haemoglobin (Figure 3).
It was the crystallographer JD Bernal’s interest in life – particularly the 
function of water in living things – that led him outside the territory of 
ordered periodic crystal structure in his attempt to model the configuration 
of a liquid. In the late 1950s, he devised a very unconventional process 
to do so, one that was designed to ensure the production of a ball-and-
spoke model with as random an arrangement of atoms (or balls in this 
case) as possible. He built the model in his office at Birkbeck College 
where he knew he would be interrupted, as he later explained, ‘every 
five minutes or so’, after which he would return to work each time ‘not 
remembering what I had done before the interruption’, thus achieving 
a disordered arrangement of balls and spokes (Bernal, 1964[1962]: 301–
302; Brown, 2005). Bernal’s process resembled a choreographed chance 
operation dependent upon the disruption of the scientist’s flow. It resulted 
in a physical structure for liquid’s essential randomness, part of Bernal’s 
Figure 1 Watson and Crick’s reconstruction of  
the double helix model of DNA  (1953), which  
is on display in the Science Museum. Science  
Museum Group Collection © The Board of  
Trustees of the Science Museum.
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work, ultimately, towards the notion of water as a ‘random network’ and a 
representation of a vital element of the flow of life arrested (Brown, 2005; 
Finney, 2007: 40) (Figure 4).
Bernal’s model overlays two visions at once: the crystallographic impulse 
towards structural understandings of life, on one hand, and the impossibility 
Figure 2 Selected Festival Pattern Group products and the crystallographic 
diagrams from which they were derived, featured in Mark Hartland 
Thomas, The Souvenir Book of Crystal Designs (London: Council of 
Industrial Design, 1951), p. 9 © Design Council Archives.
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Figure 3  Crystallographic diagram of insulin (right) and lace pattern 
derived from it (left) as part of the Festival Pattern Group project. Mark 
Hartland Thomas, The Souvenir Book of Crystal Designs (London: Council 
of Industrial Design, 1951), p. 4 (detail) © Design Council Archives.
Figure 4 Bernal building a model of a liquid  
in his office. © John Finney. 
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of ordered structure in liquid matter, on the other. This, alongside Bernal’s 
flow/freeze/flow/freeze pattern of working that generated his model, 
mirrors some of the relationships between the frozen and fluid in Leslie’s 
‘liquid crystal epoch’. The crystal and the liquid are constantly overlaid: in 
animation’s freeze-frame flux, or money’s dual mobility (‘a lubricant that 
makes life slippery’, she writes, Leslie, 2016: 14) and fixed value.
As such, the question ‘what is life?’ is not only about biology in the book 
(nor was it for Bernal, whose work also encompassed political activities, 
future speculation on human civilization and forging links between his 
scientific research and the work of artists and architects). Leslie’s liquid 
crystal dialectics reflect on life in the sense of both biology and lived human 
experience, addressing the social and economic structures of time, for 
instance, and contemporary mergings of screen, body and consumption 
in the liquid crystal display. In exploring the liquid crystal as a scientific 
concept, a phase of matter and of social life, a technological affordance 
and a worldview, Leslie exhibits a fluid form of interdisciplinarity. The 
resulting dialectics of the fluid and crystalline cut new slices through the 
histories traversed in the book, including, perhaps most significantly, the 
conditions of the technological history of now. Liquid Crystal thus reveals 
the possibilities for critical work that crosses boundaries between ‘art and 
science’, not for the sake of uniting disciplines in itself but because the 
paths traced by a material, object, metaphor or state lead us across them.
Esher Leslie (EL): The poet–botanist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was 
keen to undertake optical experiments. He reports results on a series of 
observations relating to what he calls ‘epoptical colours’, also known as 
interference colours, which appear intensely when there is a crack in 
crystal, if lenses or other hard transparent bodies are pressed together, is 
spied in the bubbles of liquid, chocolate, wine or glass, in heated metal or 
decaying glass, or in breath on glass. Goethe reported on the last of these 
conditions. He narrowed his eyes and stared at the sun in order to make 
prismatic patterns of light play on the inside of his eyelids. At other times, 
he breathed on cool surfaces, producing a film of condensation on which 
optical effects took place. His description of one such test reads like a 
sketch of animation, as both process and product:
If after breathing on a plate of glass, the breath is merely wiped away 
with the finger, and if we then again immediately breathe on the glass, 
we see very vivid colours gliding through each other; these, as the 
moisture evaporates, change their place, and at last vanish altogether. If 
this operation is repeated, the colours are more vivid and beautiful, and 
remain longer than they did the first time. (Goethe, 1840, para. 455: 189)
Goethe here evokes things that are pertinent to animation: reiteration, 
movement, fleetingness and transformation. There exists a maker, who, 
in this case, quite literally breathes the life – if we can call it that – into 
the vibrancy produced of breath and glass. This maker then abrades the 
deposit on the glass with a finger dab and finds thereby that the hues and 
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tints are fortified. These colours too have their own life – they glide and 
slide, evaporate, rearrange and dissolve. The materials, breath on glass, in 
their combination, seem to have a life, possess their own life. In another 
experiment, or perhaps a result of just an everyday journey on a frosty day, 
Goethe detected how his breath misted the window inside the carriage. On 
this window, there appeared ‘the most vivid play of colours’, intensified 
by the external darkness (para 458: 190–191). A kaleidoscope on black. 
These screens onto which Goethe exhaled were panes of glass with twirling 
colours and figures, so evanescent they could not be captured.
In a cycle of 24 erotic poems titled Roman Elegies, from some 20 years 
earlier, in 1788–1790, Goethe wrote the following, as he recalled tapping 
on his lover’s back: ‘See with a hand that can feel, feel with a hand that 
can see’ (‘Sehe mit fühlendem Aug, fühle mit sehender Hand’, Goethe, 
1994[1788–1790]: 106). The line was occasioned by his reflection on how 
caressing a woman’s skin made him see marble anew. Paul Klee rephrased 
this sentiment in 1911: ‘one eye sees, the other feels’ (Klee, 1964[1898–
1918]: 310). An artist–lover’s consideration of form and life merges and 
confuses the senses. But is there an ur-form at work in Goethe’s drumming 
on skin, a form of seeing and a form of touching that has the future coiled 
within it? Is this a flash-forward to the contemporary seeing that is feeling, 
the tactile vision of the scanning electron microscope, or the touch screen, 
which collapses seeing and touching onto one surface?
Goethe’s glass panes onto which he breathed, anticipate – but pervert too, 
and address more tenderly than may be possible for us – a contemporary 
object, an iPhone, an iPad, a tablet. They look forward to any glass surface on 
which lively colourful, twinkling events take place, an enlivened surface, in 
the shape of the touch screen, in relation to which humans become something 
like an object of the subject that is not us but rather the glassy surface. The 
touch screen user becomes an object of marketing and surveillance, with 
every click and every touch of the screen, or in other words, an object, 
or function, for it. The touch screen loops visual entertainment back to its 
machine-driven origins, when a glut of apparatuses stimulated the haptic–
optic mode of experience, each viewer fiddling with a crank, a handle, a 
drum, flicking small rigid pages or peering through a window, while rotating 
an arm. Contemporary touch screens, in their various types, resistive ones, 
capacitive ones, surface wave ones, have various modes of operation, which 
all involve an incorporation of the human body to spark off touch events. The 
resistive screens respond to any hard object bearing down and producing a 
connection between two layers, in order to change the electrical field. Other 
screen types deploy the human (or any other conductor) and its electrical 
charges, and partaking in electrical fields, operate by discharging electricity 
in the user or marshalling that user to complete electrical circuits or to disturb 
the run of waves. From the user, electricity is extracted. The screen is intimate 
with the body, whose force of pressure can be read and options presented in 
response. The hand-held machine waits for inputs, desirous of contact. The 
user’s body is legible: fingertip, nail, knuckle. Angled towards the devices, 
our hands as multiple instruments, our fingers see as they touch. Our eyes 
touch as we see. Our body is refigured. Of course this was not what Goethe 
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imagined. But it is a capability imagined in the seeing–touching fingers of the 
lover, which finds an instrumental form some 200 years later.
The other side of the screen, the side that awaits the touch and monitors the 
changes in electric state on the screen, is composed of rare earth minerals 
and metals, highly conductive ones, ones easy to deposit on the glass as a 
film and optically transparent. The landscape’s minerals are splintered into 
tiny parts and distributed on the surfaces and inside the box that is supposed 
never to be opened, at least not until its life’s end and even then not. From 
under the ground, from immense cavernous holes in the earth, from brown 
rock and mud, smashed and grabbed from the crust, elements take up 
residence inside the glossy pebbles, the black boxes, the smooth white slabs, 
the rose-gold gewgaws. In Baotou, Inner Mongolia, where masses of these 
minerals are mined, in environments prepared to accept the hazardous and 
toxic processing required, the rainwater turns murky from the interminable 
coal dust of the power stations that operate day and night, and processes 
compounds for polishing touch screens or colouring glass. This world of light 
and polish is an elemental one, binding chemical elements for its affects. At 
Baotou, there is a vast toxic lake, a ‘tailings pond’ for discarding industrial 
waste, and it is comprised of a constant flow of sludge, a radioactive clay that 
has been shed by the city’s factories. Perhaps under a certain light this black 
mire might exude a lustre akin to the plastic of a smart phone’s casing.
In this liquid crystal world, a world in which liquid crystal movements are 
gazed at more often than a lover’s eyes, there is no stillness, except for when 
we command it or when it, the technology, fails. The screen makes all history 
flow, apparently. At any moment, the screen may freeze a single moment 
and tumble its viewers into a deep space where nothing is happening and 
this lurch might be accompanied by a feeling of panic. Space is overcome 
in composite scenes, multiple tabs and constantly changing contexts. Time 
is time redoubled, accelerated, so that capitalism can communicate with 
us, constantly and from every angle. It is time for the whole world to be 
remodelled, or augmented, through liquid crystals, even three-dimensionally. 
The cities glow. The city is something we log onto. And the screens will 
become conveyors of time, in its deepest sense, in the mode that makes sense 
to us: we will calculate our age in iPhone generations.
When the artist Eduardo Kac seemingly used biotechnologies to create a 
white rabbit called Alba who glowed in the dark, shock and horror were to 
be incited at his tinkering with nature. But Alba arrived in a world in which 
transgenic GloFish© from Singapore, via Yorktown Technologies of Texas, 
and the TK-1 rice fish, from Taikong Corporation, Taiwan, are a weird but 
readily domesticated reality. These fish come in trademarked colour lines 
as Starfire Red, Electric Green, Sunburst Orange. Our second nature, our 
artificial selves and environments are nothing new, but they promise to 
develop further. Pets made from our own DNA beckon with our own eyes 
from a near future.1 Not only are there screens. We are screened. And we 
turn ourselves inside out and find liquid crystals. For they are to be found 
in the body: DNA and cell membranes have liquid crystal phases, muscles 
contain liquid crystals and our brains are 70 percent liquid crystal. Life 
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scientists have found them to be the stuff of DNA, which can assemble into 
liquid crystal phases and self-select, self-orient, self-replicate and chain-up.
If the age of advertising stuff to the masses in the last half of the 20th century 
spawned an ice-cream dream of consumerism, with all its melt and mess and 
excess, we now seem, in the age of liquid crystal, to subsist within infinite 
form, colourful confection and animated rainbow possibility, at every fingertip. 
The i-Screen is the surface through which everything passes, and the past is 
conveyed into the present as a resource, endlessly plunderable. Through it, 
individuals are persistently animated by electronic signals, exploited by the 
technological machine, but they also learn to become adept at inhabiting 
various modalities, epochs, experiences, spaces, types of attention, all 
coursing through the one entryway – where love, commerce, work, play, 
crime occur sequentially or simultaneously. There is nothing but the screen 
and the contacts file in the networked society. The screen’s diversity of inputs 
translates into diversity of outputs and each subject ‘flexibilizes’ himself or 
herself in response. The artist too – like any other fully flexibilized post-post-
modern neoliberal self – will reproduce himself or herself multiple times, 
as trinket maker, lecturer, showman, shop keeper, TV station boss, comics 
writer, DJ, record producer, engaging in multiple performance tests … How 
might this be visualized – through contortions perhaps – twisting a body 
round so that it can peer up its own anus where the screen is located, as Jana 
Euler’s ‘Form Follows Information Exchange 1, 2 & 3’ (2010) so explicitly 
portrays, its mannequin staring at iPad screens located on their backsides …?
And here in the rectal voids of the i-Screen, we find novel times, novel pile-ups 
and breakdowns, like that of post-continuity editing in newer action cinema 
and pop videos, a site of flows, of controlled chaos, in which the camera 
makes no sense of action, but renders only affect, something felt, in staccato 
snippets of time, hand-held and composited footage randomly segued, a 
compression, which is felt as a ripping, wounding, violent muddling. These 
hyperactive worlds of mingling, layering, intertwining, generate new forms 
of attention, perhaps a ‘continuous partial attention’ (Stone, 1998). If the 
viewer – or for that matter the artist – has only half an eye on any one thing, 
then its registration is made fully elsewhere, in becoming data. Information 
is produced, even if only as explosive ejaculations of nonsense. Never has 
more information been so constantly produced and monitored and analysed. 
The capacity to informationalize even enters into the body, grafted onto our 
own information centres, in order to be articulated on screens. And where 
the mid-century quivered in the shadow of the atom bomb, the new century 
fashions a data bomb. And the human body too is data. It is conceived as 
a location of tiny happenings that are constant and yet accessed only by 
machineries – after the stethoscope, MRI, and then bio-feedback processes, 
whereby the body receives through electrical sensors information about its 
processes. The body is quantified, voluntarily and as play, in gamification 
events that measure steps, calorific consumption and the like. In such a world 
might one configure new life forms, including techno-bodies, something like 
the psychedelic outputs of Google’s ‘Deep Dream’ artificial neural network, 
which tends to pepper everything with eyes.
  Liquid Crystals: A Roundtable  31
These days animation is not the distorted image of the self rotoscoped 
into rubbery shapes; animation itself proposes modes of being, is the 
mode of the liquid crystal working away inside us, as inside our screens, 
invisibly, visibly. Animation fabricates second lives. It calculates our risks 
and conveys or mitigates violence. Always intimate with the commodity 
through advertising, animation now sells future lives, as developers use 
it to visualize the enclaves they plan to build. Animation has found in 
art not a rival but a home, as artists gravitate towards this seductive, 
endlessly re-inventable form. Animation is part of our pasts, even as it 
models our futures. Animation is the patina that will coat these futures 
with projections in liquid crystal of enlivened surfaces through Oculus Rift, 
Project Morpheus, Magic Leap, augmented and virtual reality technologies, 
which merge data with real world environments, immersing the viewer–
participant. Animation in some form or other might train us in these new 
landscapes of ‘second nature’, these second lives, this new ontology of data 
that is mined, grown and harvested. And there is the other landscape, the 
one that exists in liquid crystal and augments the liquid crystals of the seas, 
combining with GPS data to guide ships. This one is a virtual trade wind 
that speeds things along and, as is the capacity of any technology, might 
be harnessed for other ends, disruptive ones. In the animation project by 
Will Gowland, titled Here Be Dragons: The Unstable Landscapes of GPS by _
Unknown Fields Department of Landscape Glitches_Winter 2011_Far North 
Alaska 71°17'23.2"N 156°46'38.7"W, digital icebergs, ‘protest icebergs’, 
interfere with the paths of oil tankers, which find their way through reliance 
on the data provided by GPS.2
The crystal first and then the liquid crystal were associated with life, or – 
more starkly – were and are seen as life forms. But the crystal, in its rigidity 
and in its precision, is also an emblem of death. Liquid is a force of fertility, 
of dissolving the old and the rotten. But its fatal powers and its affinities to 
capitalist circulation and the market are not to be ignored. The liquid crystal 
form was understood by many who saw it first, under the microscope or in 
drawings, photographs and animations, to be some sort of life form. It is 
captured in time, incarcerated inside the liquid crystal display, where it is 
abstracted and works on behalf of representation, illusion-generation, the 
culture industry. In installing scenes of colourful life, it mingles with, and 
perhaps occludes – or negates – the lives that apprehend it. What lives might 
instead have been led in its absence? Are these any longer imaginable or 
only depictable in liquid crystal? To think liquid crystal, from the sea of ice 
to the melting poles, is to think against the power of their subsumption and 
to hold onto their antinomic nature, their presence in us and in the world, 
their straddling life and non-life, their fantastical nature and their actuality. 
They are the most familiar thing, yet unfamiliar. To evoke the liquid and the 
crystal is to oscillate between terror and ecstasy, the poetic possibilities of 
utopian alleviation and sublime annihilation. Poetizing technology is a way 
of scooping under the economic and fatal relations in which it is entangled. 
But it is still a spectator sport, a dream, a wish, a hope that springs up 
between what is also a fight to the death.
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Barnaby Dicker (BD): I have some notes about animation in response to 
Esther’s Liquid Crystals. At times there will be some convergence between 
what we’ve seen from Benedict and what Emily and Esther talked about 
too. A key thing that came out of the book for me was the idea that the 
liquid crystal is a worldview (Leslie, 2016: 21). And that, as has already been 
mentioned, ‘the liquid and the crystal may be thought dialectically or they may 
be thought in their separation’ (p. 22). I felt that the book keeps coming back 
to a tension between media culture and the discourses that we use, relate to, 
or connect with that are communicated through and/or explicate said media 
culture. So I was wondering whether we might take these artefacts and 
discourses as different elements that combine in varying and novel ways to 
create ‘fluid/crystalline’ forms. From this perspective, when reading Esther’s 
book, I found myself asking – in relation to my topic of animation – what 
‘fluid/crystalline forms’ are we, as practitioners, critics, theorists, historians, 
consumers, social agents, or producers, animating? Processes of solidification 
or liquefaction, i.e. are we moving towards solidification? Or are we moving 
towards liquefaction? Are we animating natural forms, or are we animating 
cultural forms, or even something like social relations?
Those are the questions that span and guide my thoughts here. I think the 
issue of scale and point of view is also very important; scale in the sense 
of necessarily taking up positions on the spectrum between macro and 
micro points of view that are then coloured or skewed, as it were, laterally, 
by specific concerns and allegiances. Particularly important is the idea of 
recognition, of what we see and what we don’t see. One of the quotations 
from the German physicist Otto Lehmann in Esther’s book really stood out 
for me in this regard. In his 1901 lecture ‘Physics and Politics’, he states: 
‘observation and making discoveries is an art, which must be learned like 
many others … we have to learn to see’ (p. 29; see also Lehmann, 1901: 
49). This stood out for me because at the moment I’m very interested in 
Louis Althusser’s work. In his reading of Karl Marx, Althusser has some 
interesting ideas around the visible and the non-visible. Here is a statement 
from the mid-1960s:
The invisible is the theoretical problematic’s non-vision of its non-
objects, the invisible is the darkness, the blinded eye of the theoretical 
problematic’s self-reflection when it scans its non-objects, its non-
problems without seeing them, in order not to look at them … The 
invisible is not therefore simply what is outside the visible … the outer 
darkness of exclusion – but the inner darkness of exclusion, inside the 
visible itself because defined by its structure. (Althusser, 1979[1965]: 
27, emphases in original)
So, like Lehmann, Althusser insists that we have to learn to see the things 
that we may or may not want to see. In some ways, the discovery of 
cinematography required new ways of looking and new experiments to make 
explicit and concrete something that had always been an implicit possibility 
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– in the sense that we could have, in theory, invented cinematography 
thousands and thousands of years ago. In other words, the potential of the 
cinematographic arrangement or dispositif had to be recognized. I define 
cinematography as the rapid intermittent presentation of intensely grouped 
images. Understood in this way, cinematography's animation of discrete 
frames can be seen to entertain a productive tension between principles 
of regularity and difference that chime with Austrian physicist Erwin 
Schrödinger’s definition of periodic and aperiodic crystals (discussed by 
Leslie, 2016: 176–177; see also Schrödinger, 2012[1944]: 5). (In a nutshell: 
the periodic being regular and simple, the aperiodic, irregular and complex.)
In Liquid Crystals, Esther dedicates some space to discussing proto-
cinematography, that is to say, the earliest forms of cinematography.3 The 
history of proto-cinematography shows us the process by which the moving 
image came to visibility – both cognitively and culturally. Its evolution 
since the almost simultaneous publication of devices developed by Joseph 
Plateau in Belgium and Simon Stampfer in Austria in 1833 has been quite 
rapid. In terms of proto-cinematography, Esther focuses on Émile Reynaud’s 
Praxinoscope; a device that went through several different versions (spanning 
the late 1870s and the early 1900s), most of which are recognizable for their 
central column of mirrors.
Some time ago, art historian and curator Margit Rowell noted the suggestive 
evidence that the Czech-born, Paris-based artist František Kupka (1871–
1957) – a pioneer of the current of abstraction known as ‘Orphism’ – had 
an interest in Reynaud (Rowell, 1975a, 1975b: 48–51).4 Rowell, and before 
her, Denise Fédit (1966: 54), see this influence manifesting most directly 
in a sketch called Les Cavaliers (1900–1902); seeing in its composition a 
reference to – or interpretation of – the layout of the Praxinoscope which 
presents animations, multiplied in the central column of mirrors, flanked 
by the images swirling around the inside of the drum. If we accept this 
interpretation of Kupka’s Les Cavaliers – and I do – this exposes the 
interesting proposition that proto-cinematography did not just provide 
experimental tests or proof of perceptual or cognitive faculties, on the one 
hand, and parlour amusements, on the other; it also created new objects 
for perception, which could be looked at in a variety of ways, and started 
to shape other forms of visual culture. In the Kupka case, this relates to the 
evolution of abstract art. Orphism developed in close proximity to Cubism. 
In his recent book of poems, entitled Crystallography (2013), Christian Bök 
writes, ‘a crystal makes a lens through which the cubist painter might see the 
world as it really is’ (p. 37). Combining all of these threads, we can ascribe a 
pivotal fluid/crystalline structure to the Praxinoscope and its animation; one 
that was beneficial to the evolution of abstract art. If, from here, we move 
towards conceptualizing all cinematography as both fluid and crystalline, 
we see that Esther offers us a materialist approach quite different to that 
of Gilles Deleuze’s ‘crystal-image’ (Deleuze, 1989: 68–97), which eschews 
technology, favours a Bergson-derived ‘virtuality’, emphasizes cinema's 
narrative thematics and excludes animation.
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Esther’s discussion of Tim Macmillan’s ‘Time-Slice’ technique as ‘playing 
with or inside the binary of the fluid and the frozen … [which constitutes] 
the heart of film and most specifically animation’ (Leslie, 2016: 217) provides 
a welcome route to considering experimental film in relation to the liquid/
crystal. Connecting with Benedict’s work and presentation we encounter 
so-called structural film. Here, I want to single out the practice of creating 
‘film scores’, as used by experimental filmmakers such as Paul Sharits. I think 
these scores chart the process by which we see some kind of crystallization 
take shape. I see the relationship between the score and the film as you 
experience it on-screen embodying the parallel I mentioned earlier between 
media culture and its surrounding discourses. Writing about his film, 
N:O:T:H:I:N:G (1968), Sharits (1969: 15) claims to have been working with 
‘virtual shapes’ generated through precise use of cinematographic flicker 
effects. He offers a quotation from the Indian Upanishads: ‘As you practise 
meditation you may see in visions forms resembling snow, crystals, smoke, 
fire, lightning, fireflies, the sun, the moon.’ To which he responds, ‘I’m not 
at all interested in the mystical symbolism of Buddhism, only in its strong, 
intuitively developed imagistic power.’
So, here again, I think we see some kind of (non-exclusive) commitment to 
building films that have a fluid/crystalline structure and that actually engage 
their viewers in this way directly. Pertinent once more is Schrödinger's 
distinction between periodic and aperiodic crystals. To conclude, I return 
to my opening question – ‘what “fluid/crystalline forms” are we animating?’ 
– and give it a new spin: ‘what are the “fluid/crystalline” structures that 
are being animated?’ Are they periodic or aperiodic? Do they tend towards 
regularity or irregularity? Simplicity or complexity? Thinking about such 
questions might help us to recognize, to see, new or hidden formations in 
our media environment.
Sean Cubitt (SC): On my way to the celebratory seminar for Esther Leslie’s 
fine monograph Liquid Crystals (2016) I toyed with a turgid academic pun 
by way of a title: ‘Liquidditas and Haecceitice’, hanging ‘haecceity’, the 
principle of ‘thisness’, of the unique presence of a singular phenomenon 
to perception, with the crystalline; and ‘quiddity’, ‘thatness’ or ‘whatness’, 
the retreat of the object from perception into an essence unavailable to the 
senses, with the fluid. The pun failed, I felt, because quiddity is surely the 
more fixed of the two Scholastic categories; and haecceitas, even though 
its instant of conjuncture is of crystalline clarity in, say, Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’ employment of the idea he drew from Scotus Erigena, the more 
fleeting.
Leslie’s book is valuable not just for its novel taxonomy, nor for the gems of 
research material she teases to the surface, but for its method, fundamentally 
ideogrammic in the mode of Ezra Pound (Fenellosa and Pound, 2008): a 
compounding of complex patterns from tesserae like the poet JH Prynne 
she often quotes (eclecticism is little prized today; Leslie, like Prynne, is a 
mistress of it). And so because I began with a Scholastic play on words, it 
seemed inevitable, if not legitimate, to turn to the idea of panpsychia which 
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inhabits Leslie’s work. The universal mind of panpsychia seems to have 
been coined by the 16th-century Croatian philosopher Francesco Patrizi. In 
his Nova de universis philosophia of 1591, Patrizi treats of light emanating 
from God (a thought he may have gleaned from the 14th-century divine 
Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, whose De Luce proposed that God’s 
light, in the first words of Genesis, gave form to – in-formed – the tohu-
va-bohu, the world ‘without form and void’ that preceded Creation). For 
Patrizi, a convinced Platonist, hurrying to critique the Aristoteleanism of the 
Scholastics, this light was Soul, a universal Soul, an idea that would in time 
shape the thought of Giordano Bruno and, much later, glide, with equally 
mystic insinuation, through Quine and Whitehead towards the ‘immanence’ 
of Bergson and Deleuze.
Striding through leafy Bloomsbury on a May evening it is not hard to 
believe that light is indeed the visible form of God as various Mediaeval 
and Renaissance neo-Platonists and heirs of Trismegistus held, and that the 
visible world comprises the glittering facets of a universal intelligence. Yet 
our condition is otherwise. It is true, as Leslie demonstrates so deftly, that 
the infrastructure of our digital world is caught in the dichotomy between 
flows and lattices, and that our interfaces are ubiquitously liquid crystal 
displays flickering between the two states. But the light that proliferates 
through our networks is no longer God’s spendthrift suns but organized 
light, fruit of the engineered agitation of atoms and the meticulously guided 
and accounted passage of photons. If this is the state of the universal soul 
in the 21st century, we have a problem.
During the weeks leading up to this event, I had been preoccupied with the 
fate of images in social media. I hypothesized, on the back of Flusser’s (2000) 
dialectical phenomenology of photography, that images no longer have the 
unique referential and affective properties that Barthes (1980) ascribed to 
them but rather, from the standpoint of the systems they circulate through, 
exist as interchangeable units composing a vast, composite, mass image. 
I had come already to the conclusion that my preferred method, that of 
singling out one by one each image from the mass for the kind of attention 
that brings an image to crisis and therefore to criticism, might in fact be an 
act not of liberation but a purely nostalgic recapitulation of precisely that 
Cartesian ego-object relation which all my training had set me against.
It was a case of being careful what you wish for. If the goal of post-structural 
thought from Barthes and Lacan to contemporary neo-materialisms had been 
to liberate the self from subject–object relations and, at its best, to socialize 
in the most profound way the workings of the psyche, then the mass image 
has indeed realized that ambition. Yet what has resulted is not liberation 
but a new thralldom, this time of an ionized plasma of behaviours, mined as 
ruthlessly by contemporary capital as the ego was in earlier phases.
Methodologically, this poses a new problem: how to confront the flow of 
images through social media and other networks (the immense archives 
of X-rays and CCTV for example)? What mode of attention can bring to 
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crisis (and therefore criticism) a flow whose scale far exceeds not only 
what any individual can attend to but the sum of all the attention of all 
the human population added together? The only attention with the scale 
and speed required for the job is the very one that brought this state of 
the image about; the collective algorithm of EdgeRank and the other tools 
of Facebook, Google, Instagram and the rest. These tools exist exclusively 
for the extraction of profit. Is it possible to use the master’s tools not only 
to dismantle the master’s house but to build a new one with no trace of 
mastery?
My interest in the mass image had begun from a larger enquiry into the 
aesthetics of truth, which Aquinas defined as adequatio rei et intellectus, 
the adequation of thing and intellect (though I have seen it mistranslated to 
the effect that ‘only an adequate intellect can know a thing’ – a statement 
which has its own validity, and is perhaps germinative of capital allocating 
knowledge of the mass image to machine intelligence). Truth in Aquinas 
and under God who alone is and knows Truth, human truth therefore, 
is adequate and no more. It is an act of knowing but not necessarily of 
speaking: I ‘knew’ the dappled sunlight of those Bloomsbury squares down 
to the pigeon nesting in the branches but could not articulate it in writing in 
less than a short lifetime. Equally I can state with some certainty things that 
I do not know in any adequate sense, such as the laws of thermodynamics 
operating on the evening around me. The excellence of the universe is that 
it is never adequately knowable. The fine tunings that compose it escape, 
leaving nothing but fundamental laws. Not only do the laws not describe 
the games of light and leaves in an urban square; they are themselves taken 
on faith and, like faith, with limited understanding. We have had to invent 
closed systems in which they can operate in their pure form, with little 
evidence that the senses can descry of any such closure. A syllogism does 
not release us from this paradox, unless we derive from the mismatch of 
laws and perceptions that truth is either paradoxical or unknowable or the 
ogee of an asymptotic adequation.
Commenting on the opening line of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1961[1921]), 
Adorno (2000[1963]: 196) observed that what is significant about a state 
of affairs is not what is the case but what in it is incomplete or cannot 
be contained. Negation, void, structural absence would be some names 
for the non-identity of a state of affairs with itself, the motors that allow, 
indeed force, it to change: the potential within its actuality. The failure 
entirely to exist is the engine of becoming. The adequacy of truth is 
then its saving grace: it cannot treat the world as given (datum) or posit 
it, with an easy conscience, as possessing in whole or in its parts the 
solidity of being. There are two implications: firstly, that becoming is 
not the ontological state of the world but a result of its failure to Be; and 
secondly, that truth, as adequation of thing and mind, is momentary, a 
haecceitas whose dependence on the shifter ‘here’ illuminates its once-
and-for-all ephemerality, such that truth inheres neither in the image nor 
in its perception but in their meeting.
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The question then must be whether the databases of the mass image can 
participate in such an encounter. If, as Marx argued in the Grundrisse, 
technology is ‘dead labour’, then a demarcation distinguishing machine and 
human intelligence is not going to help us here: the intelligence of the 
ancestors congealed into the black boxes of information capital’s databases, 
even though enslaved much as light has been in our fibre optics and LCDs, 
is of a kind with our own and indeed that of any living thing, and potentially 
of the panpsychic intelligence of the universe as a whole. Facial recognition, 
the semantic web, GPS, range-finding and mass analysis of metatags, plus 
all the panoply of scientific instruments making ‘images’ from supra-
sensible wavelengths and scales all indicate that there is, if anything, a 
greater adequation of the machine intellect to things than anything human 
minds can achieve. That, however, is not the point to be prised out from 
Aquinas’ formula. Nor is it simply that the world is not data, since data are 
secondary statements about states of affairs, not states of affairs themselves 
or knowledge of them derived from the encounter. The critique of data is 
an extension of familiar critiques of representation, valuable as such but not 
itself the instrument we need to drive data into crisis.
The mythos of the image – for example in Barthes’ later, melancholic 
writing – is of a discrete entity apart from the world, even the world it once 
recorded. In an earlier pamphlet answering attacks on his literary criticism, 
Barthes suggests a more useful approach for us:
… a term may be formulated only once in the whole work, and yet, 
as a result of a certain number of transformations which, precisely, 
define structural phenomena, be present in the work ‘everywhere’ and 
‘always’. (Barthes, 1987[1966]: 34, emphases in original)
Until the advent of the mass image, the turn of phrase ‘The Image’ was a 
misnomer: there was no single quidditas shared by every child’s crayoning, 
scientific observation and discarded postcard. That is no longer quite the 
case: today all images are gathered together under the structured unity of 
database logic. Whether one agrees that an image is a structure or not, the 
database most surely is; and therefore Barthes’ observation is the more 
precious for the new circumstance. What is most valuable about the mass 
image is not its aggregation but the exceptions to its generality, not because 
they escape but because they indicate the structural operation itself, just 
as a single poetic image may be the secret fulcrum on which the literary 
work levers a world into existence. I doubt this new method can hinge on 
an individual image; but should appear as structural to the massification 
of images, in the taxonomic principles governing the tesserae, or in the 
contradictions of their internal logic, in the manner of Marx’s unpicking of 
the emporium of commodities.
And so I returned to that stuffy joke. Is it not the case that just as the 
dissolution of the Cartesian subject became a new servitude, so the 
philosophy of flux foretold what now we inhabit: frictionless capital and the 
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market as ocean of intensities? Liquidity – which in economics means the 
ability of cash and other forms of funds to shift values at the highest speed – 
is indeed the quidditas of the contemporary world; and the crystalline form 
of haecceity that instantaneous extraction of non-identity from the flow. 
The liquid/crystal dialectic Esther Leslie has brought us is a tool for creating 
crisis in the triumphal smooth spaces of financialization.
***
Question: Benedict, I want to ask a question about screens … because you 
use the screen to make the film, and the screen is thus both the means and 
the medium by which …
Benedict Drew: I made the film last night while I was having dinner, with 
my phone, my laptop, and Master Chef on in the background, my partner 
was on her phone and our daughter was on her phone and …
EL: It’s inescapable, isn’t it? That’s why I wanted to think about the liquid 
crystals in ourselves. If we’re thinking about screens, we’re also thinking 
about ourselves since we are liquid crystal devices. It’s not that you can step 
away. We have to engage with the screen that’s projected into and out of 
yourself because otherwise it would be some weird kind of ‘Primitivism’, so 
you can’t side-step it. 
Benedict Drew: It was originally a web essay, and it was originally about … 
It’s curious, this addiction to screens, this being drawn, moth-like, towards 
the screen, and knowing it’s totally banal. And how it’s tied to a networked 
social media which is nothing more than a monetization of that banality. 
And that the device in your hands, that you’re paying through the nose for, 
has so much value attached to it, and all this labour, and all this waste, and 
destruction of the natural world … And you just get distracted and think: 
‘Oh, I wonder what’s happening on Instagram? Did anyone like my photo?’ 
It’s totally addictive. It’s the allure.
EL: For me, its allure all concentrates in the jewel-like beauty, the crystallized 
beauty, combined with that flow of time. That there may always be another 
‘like’, there may always be a new news event. It’s that weird dialectic again 
between the frozen focus and the endless fluid movement, and it’s totally 
compelling for many people, and maybe it is a kind of identification or 
recognition of something very internal to ourselves. That would bring us 
back to Emily’s discussion of Bernal’s amazing construction of the flow of 
life arrested, his notion of water as a ‘random network’. And his mode of 
making it! Wanting those interruptions! His needing the knock on the door 
to divert the banality of the atomic model he is building is interesting, as 
if that loss of attention would make it build itself in a way more akin to 
liveliness.
EC: It’s a very organized way to model disorder. It seemed to be very much 
grounded in his crystallographic practice, which is so based on elucidating 
and representing structures, yet at the same time in order to break out of 
that, he had to create a very well-structured plan to create randomness.
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EL: It’s not unfamiliar; it’s like John Cage refracted into other areas.
EC: Bernal actually did similar experiments with steel ball bearings inside a 
balloon. Another way in which he set out to understand, in a very material 
way, the irregular structure of a liquid, was through a modelling experiment 
that involved filling a balloon with steel balls, then pouring paint inside 
the balloon, some of which would drain out, and when the paint dried, it 
would reveal the contact points between the steel balls. This was part of 
his exploration of ‘heaps’, or irregular arrangements of atoms like you find 
in a liquid, as opposed to the ordered arrangements of atoms into a ‘pile’ 
in solid crystalline materials. It was another kind of physical investigation 
using chance or indeterminacy. Bernal was involved in the worlds of art 
and design at the time, and had close friendships with several artists, so it’s 
possible he was aware of John Cage, but I’m not aware of any evidence that 
he influenced Bernal’s research.
Question: Thank you very much! I enjoyed all of your presentations. To 
go back to Esther’s really interesting analysis of touch and seeing, and 
the relationship between those two. Anecdotally and banally, recently I 
took students to the National Gallery to look at John Constable’s great 
big landscapes. Stood in front of the canvases, I asked them to download 
images of the paintings onto their mobile phones, and then I asked them 
a really easy question: which do you prefer? There was a shuffling, and 
embarrassment, and a feeling that they shouldn’t really be allowed to say 
this, but 60 percent or 70 percent of the students said they preferred the 
image on the phone even though they were sitting in front of the actual 
painting. When I asked them why, they shuffled again, and said that it is 
because they could touch the screen and move the image. It had to do 
with their possession of touch and sight, as opposed to merely looking 
at the six footers – that completely immerse you, of course, because if 
you are close enough to them, you can’t see outside them, but that didn’t 
compel them as much as the image on their phones, even though they were 
embarrassed, which I found interesting: that they were embarrassed to tell 
me they preferred the touch of the screen, the seduction of the screen, that 
amalgamation of looking and touching that wasn’t possible with the actual 
paintings. Had we been able to touch the six footers without being thrown 
out of the National Gallery, that would have been an interesting experiment, 
but I wasn’t prepared to go that far.
EL: I wonder if it’s more about the facility the student had over it, to be 
able to enlarge, glide around it, to become … Ken Morse, the rostrum 
camera operator of Ways of Seeing! It comes back to Barney’s point about 
making new ways of seeing, new visualities; this seeing–touching is just 
what they’re comfortable with. Does it relate to a possessive individualism, 
or is it more utopian than that, or is it more about Goethean intimacy? What 
I find alienating or odd about touch screens is that you’re not touching it; 
you’re always touching glass, you’re always touching the same smoothness. 
There’s a barrier that leads to the desire, as Hito Steyerl has it (in her 
films STRIKE, 2010, and STRIKE II, 2012), to smash to get underneath it. 
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Attributing liveliness to it, she also remarks on her imagination of the 
screen’s liquid crystals ‘turning into stone in an instant’. She asks us to 
imagine them fossilizing, ‘as if in a flash, and breaking all screens open from 
within’ (Steyerl, 2017: 386) But we are stuck on the surface, even if it feels 
as if we are taking into ourselves or projecting ourselves into it, and that 
simply becomes … preferable.
BD: I very much like Esther’s comment that the smart phone is the new 
pebble because that made me think of the Makapansgat pebble, which is 
one of my favourite things, which I would love to hold. I think it’s about 
two and a half million years old and it’s a little face, just two eyes and a 
mouth, and it’s naturally formed, and it was carried by our ancient hominid 
ancestors from a river bed in South Africa, some distance back to their 
camp. Apparently, the hominids were not anatomically able to fashion that 
object, the face, but they clearly recognized the symbolic potential of it. So 
I like this idea that the new pebble, just like that old pebble, returns us to 
this same issue of being allowed to handle some thing, or seem to own it or 
pass it around and interrogate it. This is perhaps an issue that chimes more 
with craft and handiwork than with high or fine art.
EL: In a way, the smartphone could provide a re-affirmation of object-hood. 
It could be the object that has reintroduced the desire for our hands to hold 
something, to have a gadget between our fingers, on our palms, always close, 
also drawing our touch and eyes to it. This weekend I’ve been introduced 
to ‘the craze that’s sweeping the nation’: the fidget spinner! We’re now the 
proud possessors of two in our household. It’s a plastic or metal item whose 
sole function is for you to spin it around and round and round and look at 
it. And now every child in the land has them. Originally it was developed for 
ADHD and autism, as toys for sensory feedback, the pleasures of repetitive 
behaviour, and so on. And then they became executive stress relief toys, 
and now all the children have them. What is that about? That sense of 
physicality, of having the object in the hand, and of having control over it, 
what is that about?
Benedict Drew: The ADHD thing, and the social media thing about 
checking your smart phone all the time, they’re linked. Mark Leckey talks 
about the huge percentage of coders and programmers that could be on the 
autistic spectrum and, by ever increasing our online life, we’re entering into 
that vision. That kind of way of looking at the world overtakes us.
SC: The beautiful repetition. And the other thing about the smart screen’s 
navigability is that it smashes up that tyranny of perspective that has 
occupied us for so long, especially in lens-based technologies, which 
are less perspectival than, let’s say, famous examples from Caravaggio 
like The Supper at Emmaus (1601), where the arms reach the canvas 
and the basket of fruit is leaning beyond the picture plane into the real 
world. There’s a sense of the limitations of an older pictorial regime that 
Constable is an absolute master of, but he never comes forward before 
the picture frame. In Constable, everything is retreating and you’re going 
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into it. Caravaggio's Supper shows a way of bringing that world forward, 
which is interesting. But then the other problem is the screen, the glass 
screen, because that does a whole bundle of things. One of them that 
Esther points out in the book is about indium tin oxide, widely used in 
display technologies and LEDs. It ought to make us more magically – and 
ecologically – engaged with both the represented and the object that we 
are physically holding, but in actuality it gives the impression of doing 
that while at the same time removing the object from the experience 
because of the transparency that makes it valuable in the first place, 
and because it depends on an utterly un-ecological action, which is to 
pile all the indium in the world into very small portable gadgets – and 
incidentally on the silvering of DVDs and optical media – to the extent 
that there is now more indium in waste piles by a considerable majority 
than there is left in the ground. So what we tend to do is to take the 
living rocks and not only rip them out but crush them, take out the bits 
we want, discard the rest with wild abandon, and then we have these 
intensely reconfigured quantities of tin that was once very common; it 
isn’t anymore. And it’s scary, it leaves all sorts of scars, like Cornish 
tin mines and their still toxic tailings, abiotic even after they have been 
abandoned for at least a century, and were poor picking for a century 
before that. So there’s a weird mix of an ecological and an un-ecological 
process, which is precisely where that liquid crystal dialectic operates. If, 
on the one hand, I’m wary of flows, because they have been appropriated 
as metaphor in the finance sector, on the other hand, the crystalline is 
equally an emblem of a deeply frightening ecological process of extraction 
and concentration, which is, in the end, extravagantly wasteful.
EC: On the topic of the screen interface, I found the Goethe quote about the 
finger that can see incredibly compelling: that bodily interaction also affects 
what we expect back after we touch the screen. One of my students, Lucy 
Hardcastle, in the Information Experience Design MA at the RCA has been 
doing research on YouTube ASMR videos. ASMR is a condition in which 
certain sounds (usually), like whispering or small movements of materials 
close to the ear, can trigger a certain kind of tingly feeling on the viewer 
or listener’s scalp or in the brain, almost like an electrical sort of feeling. 
There isn’t a lot of research about ASMR, but it’s probably the case that it 
existed before the internet! That said, ASMR as a phenomenon and a culture 
has grown up online, in part because it sits very well in that space. Now 
the videos themselves are incredibly material: a lot of ASMR videos show 
hands moulding or tapping on some kind of sonorous substance like glass 
beads or slime. Grooming, and the materials associated with the act, are 
a prominent feature too; quiet processes like hair brushing, or of scissors 
snipping hair around the neck are amplified in the videos.
Benedict Drew: It’s so interesting to consider this through the prism of 
structural/material film and also avant-garde music, and the history of sound 
art; because it’s all about a really close listening.
EC: It’s like being touched back by the screen!
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Benedict Drew: Yes, it’s like expanded cinema and also pure affect. It’s not 
about content; it’s about what it makes you feel, and your physical response 
to that.
EL: The work by structuralist filmmaker Paul Sharits, with its intense blasting 
with a rainbow of different colours, produces something bodily. It has retinal 
effect, but also a bodily one. His 1968 film T,O,U,C,H,I,N,G seems to know 
this. It has a static image of a man’s bare shoulders and head countered by 
flickers of colours, flash frames and the word ‘destroy’ repeated over and over 
until it becomes nothing. But it touches something, touches a nerve, maybe. In 
a statement prepared for the Fourth International Experimental Film Festival in 
Knokke-le-Zoute, Belgium, in 1967, he wrote of this ‘mandala’ work:
I wish to abandon imitation and illusion and enter directly into the higher 
drama of: celluloid, two-dimensional strips; individual rectangular 
frames; the nature of sprockets and emulsion; projector operations; 
the three-dimensional light beam; environmental illumination; the 
two-dimensional reflective screen surface; the retinal screen, optic 
nerve and individual psycho-physical subjectivities of consciousness. 
(Sharits, cited in Art Forum, 2015)
That ‘higher drama of celluloid’ is its physicality that acts on us – and us on 
it – through the varied combinations of light, reflection, volume, nervous 
apprehension, the capacities of our eyes, brains and minds.
EC: The thing about ASMR is that the physical relationship goes the other 
way too, and there’s an expected reciprocity, like you’d expect with another 
human being.
Benedict Drew: What’s interesting about the ASMR phenomenon is that it’s 
kind of soaked in self-help. It’s all about – and this goes back to what Sean 
was saying – feeling good; it’s full of positive affirmation, delivered in dulcet 
tones. It’s like: ‘you’re an amazing person, and I’m going to crinkle some 
paper for half an hour, because you deserve it.’
EC: The effect is meant to be so physical; it’s not only for a sense of mental 
well-being; there’s an actual physical sensation.
Benedict Drew: There’s a lot to talk about how it’s pornographic too, and I 
don’t think that can be ignored. I think it’s interesting that it might be a new 
kind of pornography, which is probably what we need. It lacks violence, 
and it’s not gender specific …
SC: That’s as maybe, but polyurethane crinkling does have a terrible 
environmental reputation!
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Notes
1.  As imagined in Alexey Marfin’s 7-minute film Blue-Eyed Me (2014).
2.  See William Gowland, Here Be Dragons: williamgowland.co.uk (2012).
3.  For source texts and commentary regarding proto-cinematography, see Dicker 
(2016).
4.  Among Kupka’s possessions was an 1896 or 1897 prospectus for Reynaud’s 
Pantomimes Lumineuses, which had been projected at the Musée Grévin since 
1892.
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